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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN CLINTON SMITH,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
Case No. 970619-CA

vs.
MAURINE SMITH, nka
MAURINE ADAMSON1,
Defendant - Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is a an appeal as ofrightin a domestic relations proceeding in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County. This Court has jurisdiction over this direct appeal pursuant to
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to determine that the Decree of Divorce
was clear and unambiguous, thus barring extrinsic evidence as to the parties intent at the time they
entered into their stipulation upon which the Decree is based? This Court should accord the district
court's interpretation of an unambiguous contract no deference, but review it for correctness. Homer

The appellee was known as Maureen Christensen at the time of the evidentiary hearing.

v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); Horrellv. Utah
Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 909 P.2d 1279 (Utah App.1995), cert, denied, 920 P.2d 1194 (Utah
1996). Drake v. Industrial Comm'n., 317 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1997); State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d
278 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved at the June 4,1997 evidentiary hearing (Transcript, page
7, lines 12-22).
2, Did the district court err by effectively modifying the parties1 Decree of Divorce in the
absence of a petition for modification and a showing of- a substantial and material change in
circumstances not contemplated since entry of the Decree? The decision to deny Smith's motion to
not proceed with the evidentiary hearing should be deemed a conclusion of law; and the review the
district court's conclusion should be under a correction of error standard. Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d
871 (Utah App, 1992); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App.), cert, denied 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1989). This issue was preserved at the June 4, 1997 evidentiary hearing (Transcript, page 5,
lines 13-24).
3. Did the district court err by failing to characterize the Adamson's motion to Amend
Divorce Decree as a Motion to Set Aside under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and did
the district court further err by failing to bar the Defendant's Motion as not brought within a timely
manner under said Rule? This issue raises a question of law and should be reviewed for correctness.
This issue was preserved at the June 4, 1997 evidentiary hearing (Transcript, page 5, lines 6-13).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties in this action were divorced on or about September 1984. Paragraph 2i of the
Decree of Divorce awarded the Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Adamson") one half (14) of the
then present value of the Appellant's (hereinafter referred to as Smith) International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers pension (IBEW plan). The Decree was silent as to two other pension plans held
by Smith at the time of entry of the Decree — the 8th District Electrical Pension Fund (8* District
Plan) and the National Electrical Benefit Fund (NEBF plan). Eleven years later, in August 1995,
Adamson filed a motion with the district court to amend the Decree for the inclusion of QDRO
language as to the two other plans.2 At that time, Adamson argued that she was entitled to one-half
of the two other plans arguing that the IBEW had "changed its name"fromto the 8th District and
NEBF, or a combination thereof,3 characterizing her motion as a simple housekeeping matter to
reform the Decree to reflect that name change..
Smith contested the motion. He demonstrated, and it is now undisputed that the 8th District
and NEBF plans never changed their names at all — that they where wholly distinct plansfromthe
IBEW Plan. Further Smith argued that Adamsoris motion was actually in the nature of a Rule 60(b)
motion to set aside the Decree, the time period of which for bringing said motion had long since
expired, that in the alternative the motion sought a modification of the decree without thefilingof

2

Adamson's motion and affidavit were signed in May 1994 but notfileduntil August 1995.

3

Affidavit of Defendant dated May 16, 1994, paragraph 4.
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a petition and a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.
Adamson then argued, in the alternative, that the parties had intended that Adamson be
awarded one half (V4) of all three of the plans held by Smith, not just the IBEW Plan, that the Plaintiff
failed to disclose the existence of the NEBF and 8th District plans, and that a hearing should be held
to determine the intent of the parties. Smith argued that the Decree was clear and not ambiguous,
and that it was therefore improper for the court to consider extrinsic evidence of parties1 intent some
twelve years in the past.
On April 1,1996 the district court entered an order setting an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of [Smith's] retirement plans when stipulating to the Decree of Divorce. On June 4, 1997, said
evidentiary hearing was held, over Smith's objection, which resulted in the Findings and Order upon
which this appeal is taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Smith does not contend that the district court made erroneous findings based upon the
evidence and testimony presented at the June 4, 1997 evidentiary hearing. Rather, he argues that it
was improper for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing at all.
Firstly, the district court further erred by failing to determine that the plain language of the
Decree was clear, and that as a result it was improper to look beyond the four corners of the
document and take additional evidence as to the intent of the parties when entering into their
agreement. Smith asserts that looking at the plain language of the document, there can be no other
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reasonable interpretation than that Adamson was awarded one half of the IBEW Plan. As a result,
conducing an evidentiary hearing as to the parties' intent was error. The matter warranted denial of
thee motion as matter of law. A motion for summary judgment, however, would have been
procedurally improper because it was a motion that was before the district court, not an underlying
action.
Secondly, the district court erred because it modified the Decree without requiring Adamson
to file a petition for modification and make a showing of a substantial and material change in
circumstances since entry of the decree, not contemplated by the parties at the time of entry of the
Decree.

The matter that was before the Court was a motion to amend, not a petition for

modification.
Finally, the district court erred because it failed to deny Adamson's motion as having been
brought in untimely fashion, whether characterizing it as brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) or pursuant
to Rule 60(b) — an attempt to set aside the decree due to the failure of Adamson's former counsel to
ensure that decree specifically awarded Adamson one-half of all three plans held by Smith.4 The
district court should have characterized the motion as a motion to set aside and should have denied
the same based upon a failure to bring the same within the time period prescribed by the rule.

4

Smith disputes this assertion and alleges that the parties fully negotiated what eventually became
the clear language of the Decree.
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ARGUMENT
I

THE LANGUAGE OF THE DECREE IS CLEAR, AND IT WAS ERROR TO RECEIVE
EXTRINSIC EVTOENCE VIAEVTOENTIA^^
PARTIES.
A.

PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING OF THE STIPULATION.

Clear and unambiguous contract terms are to be interpreted "according to their plain and
ordinary meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence." Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622,629 (Utah
App. 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994); see also Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St.
Benedict'sHosp., 852 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah App. 1993) ("To interpret a contract, we first look to
the four corners of the document to determine the intent of the parties."), vacated on other grounds,
884 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1994). Only when a decree is ambiguous should courts look beyond the four
corners of the document and consider extrinsic evidence to explain the intent of the parties. Winegar
v. FroererCorp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992);
Williams v. Miller, 794 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1990); Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). A decree is ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies. In this case the decree is clear and not ambiguous. Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. Smith
cannot comprehend how one could possibly conclude, solely by a reading of the decree, that
Adamson was entitled to anything other than the IBEW Plan. Only by the taking of extrinsic evidence
as the intent of the parties could one reach such possible conclusion, and because the terms of the
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decree are clear the admission of extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent was improper.
In Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this court addressed a nearly identical
situation in a domestic relations case, where the decree of divorce was silent as to the husband's
retirement plan, and where the wife attempted to later reopen the case several years later for
distribution of the same, alleging she had been unaware of its existence at the time of divorce. The
Ostler court, however, upheld the district court's refusal to modify the decree of divorce on the
grounds that "the wife had the opportunity to litigate the issue at the time of the divorce, and since
she failed to do so, the claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata." While the Ostler Court
recognized that res judicata in divorce actions was unique "because of the equitable doctrine which
allows courts to reopen ... property distributions if the moving party can demonstrate a substantial
change of circumstances", the court specifically held that the wife's "claim of a lack of knowledge of
the retirement benefits does not constitute a change of circumstances." Ostler, citing Throckmorton
v. Throckmorton, 161 P.2d 1921 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In so holding, the court adopted "the policy
interest favoring the finality of property settlements [as] compelling." Ostler, quoting Guffey v.
LaChance, 618 P.2d 634 (Ariz. Ct App. 1980).
B.

EQUITY IS NOT AVAILABLE TO ADAMSON.

In addition, of paramount importance is that the decree was based upon a property settlement
agreement, sanctioned by the district court. As a result, Adamson should have been precluded as a
matter of law from seeking equity to realignrightsand privileges she voluntarily contracted away.
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Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983). This case is also similar to Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248
(Utah 1980), wherein the decree, as here, was based upon a settlement agreement. When the husband
later sought equitable relief in a modification proceeding, the court denied his request stating as
follows:
"Defendant's contention that the court must look behind his stipulation in
order to do equity is without merit. True it is that, in making a division of property
by a decree of divorce a trial court is governed by general principles of equity. It is
likewise true that the court retains continuing jurisdiction over the parties and may
modify the decree due to a change in circumstances, equitable considerations again
to govern. It must, however, be added that, when a decree is based upon a property
settlement agreement, forged by the parties and sanctioned by the court, equity must
take such agreement into consideration. Equity is not available to reinstaterightsand
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret the
bargain made. Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court
where a property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the decree, and the
outright abrogation of the provisions of such an agreement is only to be resorted to
with great reluctance and for compelling reasons. (Citations omitted).
Adamson was represented by counsel throughout these proceedings and had the advice of her
counsel prior to entering into the stipulation upon which the decree is based. Even if the court did
not agree with the distribution of Smith's pension and retirement plans in the decree, it should not
have attempted to substitute its judgment for that of the parties in entering into what the resulted in
the clear language of the written stipulation. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App.
1990).
H.

THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE MODIFIED THE DECREE WITHOUT
THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR MODIFICATION.
Adamson's Motion to Amend effectively sough to modify the decree without the filing of a
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petition for modification and the requirement of a showing substantial and material change in
circumstances not contemplated at the time of entry of the decree. Firstly, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration. Rule 6-404(1) provides, in relevant part, that "proceedings to modify a divorce
decree shall be commenced by thefilingof a petition to modify in the original divorce action" and "no
request for a modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an order to show cause."
In this case there existed no underlying petition for modification. Adamson chose instead to attempt
to modify the divorce decree by way of motion, in violation of Rule 6-404(1).
Utah case law also mandates that a party requesting that a divorce decree be modified must
demonstrate that there has been "a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of
the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Whitehouse; Naylor v. Nqylor, 700 P.2d 707
(Utah 1985); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). In this case the Court should have
but failed to characterize Adamson's motion as one which sought to modify the decree of divorce,
and should have required Adamson to file a petition for modification alleging a substantial and
material change in circumstance before entertaining her request for relief,
m.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DENIED THE MOTION AS UNTIMELY.
This matter came before the court on a pleading entitled "Motion to Amend Divorce Decree

for Inclusion of QDRO Language". The motion did not specify which Rule of Civil Procedure upon
which it relied. Smith asserts two possibilities. Since captioned as a Motion to Amend, it is
reasonable that Adamson relied upon Rule 59(e) (Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment). The
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substance of the motion, however, suggests that it was improperly captioned. The relief sought was
the type of relief ordinarily sought under either Rule 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect)5, or Rule 60(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party).6
Regardless of characterization, however, the motion should have been denied as not brought
in a timely fashion. A Rule 59(e) motion must befiledwithin ten days of the entry ofjudgment, and
a motion under Rules 60(b)(1) or (3) must be filed within three months of the date of entry of the
judgment. Even if Adamson were to assert that her motion could be brought under Rule 60(b)(7),
her motion would still have been untimely as not having been brought within a reasonable time.7
CONCLUSION
The district court's chief error was in failing to declare the decree as clear and unambiguous,
and allowing extrinsic evidence as to the parties1 intent. It would defy reason to assert that the plain
language of the decree could somehow render Adamson a claim to anything other than the IBEW
Plan. The only way that the district court could have even come to suspect that the language of the
5

The crux of Adamson's argument at the evidentiary hearing was that at the time she execute the
stipulation she believed the term "IBEW pension" also encompassed the NEBF and 8th District Plans
(Transcript, page 27, lines 13-24), but that she later received letters in late 1993 indicating that the plans
had either changed names or were separate and distinctfromeach other (Transcript, page 39, lines 19-25),
thus prompting thefilingof her motion.
6

Adamson argued at one point that Smith had fraudulentlyfoiledto disclose the existence of the
NEBF and 8th District Plans, but later retracted that position.
7

Adamson testified that shefirstbecame aware in late 1993 that the NEBF and 8th District Plans
were not a part of the IBEW Plan. She did notfileher motion, however, until August, 1995.
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decree might have encompassed the 8th District and NEBF Plans, and district court ruling was based
entirely upon the testimony elicited at the evidentiary hearing (Transcript, page 58, lines 14-15). The
court also should have required Adamson to file a petition for modification prior to entertaining her
motion, and should have required her to make a showing of a substantial and material change in
circumstances as a prerequisite to granting the relief she sought. Finally the district court should have
dismissed the motion as untimely, whether characterized either on brought pursuant to Rule 59(e)
or Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ADDENDUM
No addendum to this brief is necessary under Rule 24( 11) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this

i3

day of

p[(i^L

j*>
RUSSELL Y. MDSfAS
Attorney for Appellant
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